39 ideas
| 13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
| 13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
| 13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
| 13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
| 13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
| 13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
| 13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
| 13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
| 13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
| 13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
| 13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
| 13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
| 13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
| 20457 | Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli] |
| 13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
| 20468 | Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli] |
| 20467 | Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli] |
| 13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
| 19729 | 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T] |
| 19728 | Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T] |
| 13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
| 13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
| 13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
| 20469 | There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli] |
| 20461 | The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli] |
| 20462 | Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli] |
| 20463 | There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli] |
| 20464 | The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli] |
| 20459 | Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli] |
| 20460 | Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli] |
| 20466 | Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli] |
| 20465 | Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli] |
| 20458 | The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli] |
| 20470 | Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli] |